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The Federal Courts as an Effective Forum
in Shareholders' Derivative Actions
Francis C. Sullivan*
INTRODUCTION
The corporate structure, as we know it in the United States
today, is an uneasy balance between the conflicting rights and
desires of several groups. The constant pressure of these various
groups to compel corporate action favorable to a particular
group is not always apparent to outsiders, but it is a factor of
the greatest importance in determining the direction of cor-
porate policy.
The groups involved in corporate operations are generally
listed as being four in number: the stockholders, those persons
who have invested funds in the corporation with the expectation
of receiving a fair return; the employees, those persons who
today are the most organized of the groups through labor unions;
the creditors, the group who through substantial investments
of one kind or another make the expansion of corporate activi-
ties possible; and the public, the long-suffering consumer group
that provides the corporation with a market for its products
and a showcase for its philanthropic activities.
To this enumeration the writer would add a fifth group
having a direct interest in corporate activity and a reason for
seeking to direct the policy of the corporation to the fulfillment
of its own ends. This, of course, is the management of the cor-
poration, a highly trained professional executive group that op-
erates entirely separate and apart from the stockholder group
in the large corporation, and which has ends in mind which
do not always square with those of the "ownership" class.
It seems fruitless to restate the various interests and desires
of the particular competing groups here. This has been done
often and well in recent years.' It should be emphasized, how-
*Associate Professor, Loyola University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois.
1. See GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1952); BERLE, THE 20TH CEN-
TURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954) ; Rural, Corporate Management as a Locus
of Power, 3 SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS 219 (1950) ; LIVINGSTON, THE
AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958).
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ever, that we have not and perhaps never will reach that utopian
situation in which the corporation will be able to satisfy com-
pletely all of these groups at one and the same time. The present
situation is one where the corporation reacts to the pressures
of the competing groups through a constant process of adjust-
ment. The line of corporate progress is not one straight path
to the end, but is rather a series of deviations from this path
towards the interests of one or more of the particular groups-
a series of swings back and forth across the basic line causing
one at times to wonder whether or not the end is clearly in
view.
In this process of progress, the interests of some of the
competing groups will of necessity be subordinated to those of
the temporary victor-a process by which some one or more
will be hurt. The purpose of this article is to focus upon one
group, the stockholders, and to examine the situation where this
group has been hurt by those actions of management constituting
an abuse of its powers. Specifically, the writer intends to ex-
amine the availability and suitability of the federal courts as
a forum for the effective redress of these wrongs.
BACKGROUND
In the early days of industrial development and expansion,
the individual possessing limited capital could expand his sphere
of operations by joining with one or more persons similarly
situated in a pooling operation. A unit was formed-the cor-
poration-consisting of the sum of its parts; a sum which could
accomplish that which its components individually could not.
The owners of the respective interests were, for the most part,
also the operators of the enterprise, and at this point we have
no separation or competition between ownership and control of
the corporation. As the operation prospered and further expan-
sion was contemplated, additional capital became necessary. In
the usual case, this required the addition to the corporation of
persons who were not interested to any great extent in the rou-
tine of the entity, but who were only interested in receiving a
suitable return on the capital invested. As the corporation be-
comes larger and larger, more and more the stockholders become
simply investors, persons who make available capital to the
corporation without participating substantially in the manage-
ment thereof. As the representation of the stockholder's inter-
est in the corporation achieves a value of its own, quite apart
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from that which it represents, and as the transfer of the stock
becomes a simple and ordinary process, we find that a new class
has been developed within the corporate framework. The inves-
tor-stockholder now possesses ownership, but does not have con-
trol of the operation of the corporation.
2
This situation is a natural product of the development of
corporate enterprise, but it reflects a basic change in both the
theory and the nature of the corporate device. This too has its
effects: "Generally what is good for the stockholders is good for
their corporation, and conversely what is good for the corpora-
tion is good for its stockholders. But what is good, in business
as in morals, is not always beyond debate. Differences of opinion
as to the proper course of corporate conduct are therefore in-
evitable." 8 The development of differences of opinion as to the
course of corporate conduct is not the only effect, however. With
the creation in the corporation of a new professional manage-
ment group to steer its economic course, the stockholders have
made possible the situation where the dog may bite the hand
that feeds it. The management group has the tremendous power
of the purse which it may exercise, as well as inside knowledge
of the operations and intentions of the corporation. This con-
centration of power constitutes a severe test of the honesty and
integrity of the managing group, and it is to be deplored, but
expected, that some will succumb to the forbidden fruit.4 This
paid group of professional managers may impinge upon the
rights of the stockholders in many ways profitable to them-
selves.'
When there is such malfeasance on the part of the officers
and/or directors of a corportaion, the stockholders are faced
2. See BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
c. 5 (1932).
3. ROHRLICH, LAW AND PRACTICE IN CORPORATE CONTROL 96 (1933).
4. "Executive power in a corporation must be vested in directors or some
equivalent group of managers, who generally will act with conscience and integrity
in the interest of the stockholders -the owners of the enterprise. Some corporate
managers, however, may be expected to yield to the temptation that goes with
opportunity for personal profit." Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Deriva-
tive Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30 (1947).
5. "Court records are replete with illustrations of intracorporate abuse. The
corporation can act only as a unit, and the general rule is that a vote of the ma-
jority determines the corporate will and binds the corporation. Corporate theory,
therefore, gives such abuse the form of legality." Hornstein, The Oounsel Fee in
Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1939). For a survey of
state legislation declaring a standard of conduct for corporate managers, see Horn-
stein, Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abuse - Present and Future, 41 COLux.
L. REV. 405, 429 et seq. (1941).
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with the necessity of finding a remedy which will effectively
correct the wrong done. The scope of the available remedies is
small indeed, both in number and in effectiveness. Perhaps the
first thought of the average stockholder is to "throw the rascals
out." This, of course, is easier said than done. The electoral
process by which the stockholder in theory is enabled to choose
the management of his corporation proves in practice to be
something of an illusory remedy. With the great increase in
size of the modern corporation has come a concomitant increase
in the number of stockholders,6 each of whom will own only a
relatively small number of the shares of the corporation. This
fact, together with the device of proxy voting, makes but a
hollow shell out of the once effective control device of the stock-
holder's power of the ballot.'
Next to come to mind is generally the stockholder's "escape
hatch" - his power to dispose of his shares of ownership in the
corporation. This can hardly be described as an effective remedy,
however, since the injury to the corporation through the mis-
management or malfeasance of the management group is certain
to have an adverse effect on the value of the stock owned by the
shareholder. He is, in a sense, merely cutting his losses by re-
treating from the scene of the crime. The ordinary shareholder
with but a minute interest in the affairs of the corporation
and an overriding interest in the security and prosperity of his
investment will normally choose this, the easy way out. As a
result of this usual reaction on the part of the stockholders, the
management group is oftentimes emboldened to continue or
expand its efforts to profit at the expense of the corporation,
its shareholders, employees, and creditors, and, of course, the
public. The depredations perpetrated on the corporation may,
in this situation, never come to the attention of the public, or,
indeed, to the attention of the employees or creditors of the
corporation. Skill in malfeasance is just as necessary and profit-
able as in other areas. In fairness, it may bt said that the stock-
holder who holds only a minor interest in the corporation is
probably best advised to take this course of action, for it pro-
vides him with the greatest protection at the lowest cost and
6. The number of stockholders in the United States increased from 6,490,000
in 1952 to 12,490.000 in 1959. BUREAU OF CENSUS. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 470 (1959).
7. See Comment, 3 SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS 238 (1950) ; Horn-
stein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 784
(1939) ; BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
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removes him from the possibility of being twice burnt by the
same blowtorch.
This rather jaundiced view of the self-help remedies avail-
able to the injured stockholder clearly indicates that he cannot
in the usual case protect himself against the wrongdoing of
management. The alternative is the intervention of the courts
to protect such shareholders and to remedy the wrongs com-
mitted. Obviously the courts possess the means of doing this,
but there has been, over the years, a certain reluctance on the
part of the courts to inject themselves into the complexities and
problems of conduct of corporate affairs." This reluctance is
probably an outgrowth of the judicial feeling that courts are
not regulatory bodies, that only in extremely rare situations
can they become involved in the supervision of the conduct of
private enterprise, and that the power of the courts should be
invoked only when there has been a wrong that the court is
capable of righting. This is not to say that the courts have been
unaware of the problems of the defrauded stockholder or that
the courts have turned their collective backs upon the injured
party in such cases. It does mean, however, that the path to
the attainment of judicial intervention in corporate affairs is
one fraught with much difficulty and expense. 9
The courts will readily open their doors to a stockholder who
can show that a personal right of his has been invaded by the
action of the corporation or individual members of its manage-
ment. In modern corporate affairs, however, this is a relatively
rare situation. Generally the wrong complained of is not a
direct injury to any one or more of the stockholders, but is
rather a wrong to the corporation that indirectly affects the
interest of the stockholder in the corporation. It is to correct
this situation, where a direct action is not available to the stock-
holder, that the derivative action comes into play.
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
As is indicated above, the general category of malfeasance
on the part of corporate directors and officers today consists
of actions which directly injure the corporation and only in-
8. See Berle, Historical Inheritance of American Corporations, 3 SOCIAL ME-
ING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS 189, 215 (1950).
9. For a discussion of the development of equitable control over corporate
action, see RoHRLICH, LAW AND PRACTICE IN CORPORATE CONTROL, 96 et seq.
(1933).
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directly the stockholder. When the particular wrong is com-
mitted, the corporation is, of course, entitled to bring an appro-
priate action against the wrongdoers - the directors, officers,
and/or third persons involved. This right is personal to the
corporation, as it is the wronged party. However, more than
one hundred years ago it was recognized by the courts that the
corporation, for reasons which might be perfectly honest, or on
the other hand completely sinister, might choose not to institute
the action necessary to remedy the wrong. Where the alleged
wrongdoers are in positions of control over corporate activity,
it is not difficult to see why such an action might not be com-
menced. At this point, and because of these facts, equity inter-
vened with a realistic solution to the dilemma of the aggrieved
stockholders and created a method of enforcement of the cor-
porate right by the stockholders. This is known as the stock-
holder's derivative action.10
It is important to note the technique. The courts did not
choose to ignore the corporate entity and extend the right of
the corporation to its members, nor did they create a separate
and independent cause of action on the part of the stockholders.
The method chosen was to allow one or more of the stockholders
to proceed on behalf of the corporation to enforce the existing
corporate right. A clear understanding of this distinction makes
the solution both a recognition of the traditional legal structure
of the corporation as an entity entirely separate and distinct
from its stockholder members, and a recognition of the need for
some degree of control by the stockholders over the management
of the corporation.
At the outset it must be remembered that the stockholder's
derivative action is but a procedural device for the enforcement
of substantive rights existing independently of the means of
enforcement. The derivative action does not create nor confer
upon a stockholder any substantive cause of action. This right
of action will exist by statute or decision of the particular state
governing the activities of the corporation, if it exists at all.
The means of enforcing the right - the procedural implementa-
tion of the right - will be governed by the particular rules of
the state court or by the statute and rules governing the federal
courts, depending upon the choice of forum. Our interest here
is in such an action brought in the federal courts, and thus it
10. See Prunty, The Shareholder's Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation,
32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 980 (1957).
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must be remembered that whether or not the stockholder-plain-
tiff has a cause of action that may be enforced by a stockholder's
derivative action in the federal courts is determined by the ap-
plicable state law."
The traditional situations in which the stockholders have
been authorized to bring a derivative suit are described in Hawes
v. Oakland,'2 as follows:
"Some action or threatened action of the managing board
of directors or trustees of the corporation which is beyond
the authority conferred upon them by their charter or other
source of organization;
"Or such a fraudulent transaction completed or contem-
plated by the acting managers, in connection with some other
party, or among themselves, or with other shareholders as
will result in serious injury to the corporation, or to the
interests of the other shareholders;
"Or where the board of directors, or a majority of them,
are acting for their own interest, in a manner destructive of
the corporation itself, or of the rights of the other share-
holders;
"Or where the majority of shareholders themselves are
oppressively and illegally pursuing a course in the name of
the corporation, which is in violation of the rights of the
other shareholders, and which can only be restrained by
the aid of a court of equity."
In recent years there has appeared a number of restrictions
on the right of a stockholder to bring a derivative action. 18
These limitations, generally achieved by state statutes, are based
upon a feeling that the derivative action has been used as the
vehicle for "strike" actions against corporations - actions de-
signed solely as attempts to enrich a stockholder who brings a
nuisance suit challenging a legitimate action of the corporation.
Without doubt this has happened, but the extent of the reaction
seems to be out of all proportion to the purported evil. The
effect of statutes such as the New York "security-for-expense"
11. Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1956).
12. 104 U.S. 450, 452 (1881).
13. See de Capriles, Fifteen Year Survey of Corporate Developments, 1944-
1959, 13 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) ; Katz, The Philosophy of Midcentury Cor-
poration Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 177, 184-185 (1958) ; Hornstein,
New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1947).
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provision 1 4 is to make even more difficult the prosecution of a
proper derivative action, and thus the ultimate result is the
removal from the rolls of stockholder remedies one that has
proved over the years its effectiveness to control abuses of cor-
porate power.15
In addition to the ever-growing list of statutory restrictions,
there are many other practical factors that tend to limit the
usefulness of the derivative action as a stockholder protective
device.16 The cost of such actions is, of course, great, and is
unfortunately out of all proportion to the individual monetary
advantage to be gained by the successful prosecution of the ac-
tion. Even though it is uniformly held that a stockholder who
is successful in a derivative action may recover from the cor-
poration the cost of the suit, including attorney fees, the risk
of losing such a complicated and difficult action weighs heavily
against the utilization of the device. 17 The natural disinclination
of the average stockholder to take the offensive and bring a
derivative action is understandable, and this also amounts to a
built-in limiting device.' 8 Management with the treasury of the
corporation behind it is obviously in a strong position in such
suits,' 9 and when all else fails, the management may "buy out"
the plaintiff-stockholder by offering to compromise the action.
This may occur either by purchase of the stockholder's shares
at a greatly increased price, or by arranging to reimburse the
14. N. Y. General Corp. Law § 61-b (1945) ; see Hornstein, The Death Knell
of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944) ;
Frampton, Indemnification of Insiders' Litigation Expenses, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRo. 325 (1958).
15. See de Capriles, Fifteen Year Survey of Corporate Developments, 1944-
1959, 13 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959).
16. Stockholders are reluctant to sue, among other reasons, because "they
usually know that the evidence is almost exclusively in the control of those who
are charged with delinquency; that those same individuals are likewise in control
of the funds of the corporation and may apply them in defense of their acts,
whether those acts are innocent or wrongful; that in seeking a remedy the stock-
holder will be met with every obstacle and procedural delay that the ingenuity of
skilled counsel can devise . . . ." Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240
App. Div. 242, 269 N.Y. Supp. 360, 364 (1934).
17. See Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39
COLUm. L. REV. 784 (1939).
18. "It is all very well to say that the minority stockholder has his redress if
his company is being managed in an adverse interest. He hasn't. . . . Litigating
against one of these powerful systems is an expensive business. The pitfalls and
delays are endless. It is a luxury reserved for the large holders and then only
when they have plenty of money and infinite patience." Untermyer, Some Needed
Lfgzstative Reforms in Corporate Management, An Address, quoted in ROURLICH,
LAW AND PRACTICE IN CORPORATE CONTROL 140, n. 105 (1933).
19. See Hornstein, Directors' Expenses in Stockholders' Suits, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 301 (1943) ; Note, Statutory Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses of Di-
rector-Defendants in New York, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827 (1960).
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corporation for its loss on very favorable terms. 20  It is a rare
stockholder who, when presented with one of these offers, will
not seek the course of least resistance, and this merely increases
the freedom of action of the management of the corporation.
Despite these inherent defects it seems that the number of stock-
holder's suits are increasing.2 1 This should come as no great
surprise, however, for weak as it may be and despite all of its
limitations, the stockholder's derivative action remains as the
best of the available remedies for mismanagement or malfeas-
ance 22 on the part of corporate management.28
JURISDICTION
The stockholder's derivative action may be brought either
in a proper state court or, if the requisites are met, in an ap-
propriate United States district court.24 The choice of the parr
20. "Tested functionally, the stockholder's suit -while better than nothing -
is of a low degree of efficacy. Passing over wrongs which go unredressed because
they are undiscoverable or so complicated that they cannot be unraveled before
the applicable statute of limitations has run, and passing also the technical diffi-
culties of establishing the wrong to the satisfaction of the court -in short, even
where these two hurdles could be or have been successfully overcome, the stock-
holder's suit is still ineffective. When the complainant has an airtight case and
the defendants are convinced of it, efforts will usually be made by the latter to
effect a settlement, sometimes described as 'buying-off' the complainant stock-
holder." Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abuse-Present and Fu-
ture, 41 COLUm. L. REV. 405, 425 (1941).
21. de Capriles, 1959 Annual Survey of American Law, Business Organization,
35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 613, 629 (1960).
22. "For some time one such sanction has been the stockholders' suit, char-
acterized by jurists and scholars alike as a 'wholesome' if inadequate remedy to
expose corruption in the directing of corporate activities; this sanction not only
has resulted in substantial recoveries, but has had an even more important effect
in deterring would-be malefactors." Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders'
Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31 (1947).
23. In addition to the stockholder's derivative action, New York has created a
director's derivative action (N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 60-61 (1943)) designed to
achieve the same end, and freed from the usual restrictions. "The apparent ab-
sence of other case law on the director's derivative action in New York is some-
what surprising in view of its potentialities as an instrument for enforcing the
fiduciary obligations of management in corporations where there is minority rep-
resentation on the board." de Capriles, 1959 Annual Survey of American Law,
Business Organization, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 613, 628-629 (1960). The New York
Court of Appeals has recently held that the director's derivative action is based
upon public policy, and that "the statutory authorization for suits by directors
seeks to achieve the same end of vindicating the corporation's rights by a method
less subject to the risk of abuse." Tenney v. Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204, 160 N.E.2d
463, 189 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1959).
24. New York has been a favorite place for the commencement of derivative
actions due to the concentration there of a large number of corporate directors.
In an eleven-year period 1,128 stockholder's derivative actions were filed in the
state courts of New York County compared to 130 filed during the same period
in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. After
the passage of the New York "security-for-expense" statute, the actions in the state
courts fell to an average of two per year, while in the federal court the average
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ticular forum, state or federal, involves many considerations.
As has been pointed out above, no substantive advantage accrues
to such a suit brought in federal court since the law governing
the merits of the case will be the appropriate state law. The
modern procedural rules applicable in the federal court and
especially the extensive discovery procedure, constitute, how-
ever, an attractive inducement to the attorney considering a
forum for a derivative action. The factors governing this choice
of forum are, however, so numerous and to such a great extent
a part of the strategy of particular cases as to make treatment
here impossible. Rather, we will concern ourselves with the
attorney who has made a preliminary determination that his
suit is an appropriate one for submission to a federal court, and
will investigate the problems he must face before his aim may
be realized.
Because of the limited jurisdiction of the United States
courts,2 5 the primary determination to be made is whether the
suit is within the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
federal courts. For the most part, this determination is made as
in all other cases sought to be brought in the federal courts.
The fact that stockholders' derivative actions may be brought
in the federal courts does not create a new basis of jurisdiction.
This type of action may be brought only if there exists a statu-
tory basis for the exercise of jurisdiction by the federal court.
Almost without exception, derivative actions must qualify as
diversity cases or there will not be jurisdiction. Diversity, of
course, means diversity of citizenship- all parties on one side
of the case being diverse in citizenship from all of the parties on
the other side of the controversy. 6
Keeping in mind that the corporation is an indispensable
party,27 then, the plaintiff will name as defendants the corpora-
tion and all of the alleged wrongdoers, whether directors, of-
remained fairly constant at about twelve derivative actions per year. Hornstein,
New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLUm. L. REv. 1, 12 (1947).
25. The federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction possessing only
those powers conferred by Congress. Trust Co. of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
183 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1950).
26. 18 Stat. 470 (1875), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1) (1958) provides
jurisdiction in the federal district courts for suits between citizens of different
states. The doctrine of complete diversity requires that all parties on one side
of the case be diverse from all parties on the other side. Strawbridge v. Curtiss,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 267 (1806).
27. Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100 (1945). This is based upon the fact that
the cause of action is that of the corporation, and relief, if granted, will run to
the corporation, not to the plaintiff-stockholder.
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ficers, or third persons. Generally such suits will include both
representatives of corporate management and collaborating third
persons. The citizenship of each of these defendants must be
diverse from that of the plaintiff.
The necessity of joining the corporation as a party defendant
may create a jurisdictional problem. The historical treatment of
corporations for diversity purposes has been a strange story of
judicial uncertainty and indecision. Originally corporations were
not considered to be citizens for purposes of diversity, and the
citizenship of all of the stockholders controlled.28 This doctrine
soon gave way to an expedient determination that corporations
were not citizens for diversity purposes, but that the citizenship
of each of the stockholders of the corporation would be conclu-
sively presumed to be that of the state of creation of the cor-
poration.29 This presumption governed the diversity status of
corporations for many years until Congress, in an effort to re-
duce the number of diversity cases in the federal courts, in
1958, decreed that a corporation should be deemed to be a citizen
of any state in which it has been incorporated and of the state
in which it has its principal place of business.30 The apparent
effect of this amendment is that when a corporation is incor-
porated in a state other than that of its principal place of busi-
ness, for diversity purposes, it is a citizen of at least two states-
the state of incorporation and the state in which it has its prin-
cipal place of business. If a particular corporation has been in-
corporated under the laws of more than one state, then it should
be deemed to be a citizen of each of such states.8 ' It should be
28. "That invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity, a
corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen, . . ." Bank of United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 61, 86 (1809).
29. This fiction was established in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S.
314 (1853). The reason for this judicial gymnastic was the fact that considera-
tion of the citizenship of the individual stockholders of a corporation for diversity
purposes effectively prevented corporations from suing and being sued in the fed-
eral courts. With the growth of the corporation as an important economic factor
in the United States this situation could not be tolerated, but the courts of this
day and age were not willing to take the ultimate step of declaring that an inani-
mate person could have citizenship for diversity purposes. The device of the con-
clusive presumption was evolved to solve the problem.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958), as amended by Act of July 25, 1958, § 2, 72
Stat. 415. The legislative history of this act indicates the desire of Congress to
correct "the evil whereby a local institution, engaged in local business and in many
cases locally owned, is enabled to bring its litigation into the Federal courts simply
because it has obtained a corporate charter from another State." U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 3099, 3101-3102 (1958).
31. The problem of the corporation incorporated under the laws of two or
more states created a difficult jurisdictional question for the federal courts. Was
the citizenship of the stockholders to be presumed to be that of each of the states
of incorporation or merely that of the state of first incorporation? Quite naturally
[Vol. XXII
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emphasized that the state of incorporation and the state of prin-
cipal place of business are not alternatives; the corporation
should be deemed a citizen of each and every one of these states.8 2
Essentially, this would limit the freedom of a stockholder-plain-
tiff to elect the federal courts as the forum for his suit, since
jurisdiction fails if there be identity between the citizenship of
the plaintiff and any one of the states of which the corporation
is deemed to be a citizen.
The term "principal place of business" is a troublesome one
in the extreme.83 We are told that this is a factual question to
be determined on the basis of the circumstances of each case,8 4
but what this really means is that there can be no certainty:as
to this point until the court has ruled on the question. There is
no safe test by which the attorney for the plaintiff may evaluate
the situation in his particular case, and because of this he may
find, after commencing suit in a federal court, that his deter-
mination of the corporation's principal place of business does
not accord with that of the particular judge involved, and as a
result no diversity of citizenship exists. It seems incredible that
a matter of such basic importance as the determination of the
court's jurisdiction over the subject matter should be left in
such a nebulous state. While paying lip-service to the rule that
jurisdiction either exists or it does not, the courts are forced to
determine the question on the basis of a standard which may
a split of authority arose in the courts considering this question. Compare Gavin
v. Hudson & M.R.R., 185 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1950) with Jacobson v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R., 206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 909 (1954) (per
curiam). See Notes, 34 B.U.L. REV. 495 (1954) and 3 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 98
(1955). Section 1332(c) now provides that "a corporation shall be deemed a
citizen of any state by which it has been incorporated .. " The use of the word
"each" in place of "any" in the amendment would perhaps have prevented any
misinterpretation such as that evidenced in the dicta in Jaconski v. McCloskey &
Co., 167 F. Supp. 537 (D.C. Pa. 1958). Cf. Pugh, Federal Jurisdiction and Prdc-
tice, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 142, 143 et seq. (1961).
• 32. Harker v. Kopp, 172 F. Supp. 180 (D.C. Ill. 1959) ; Diesling v. Vaughan
Wood Products, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 460 (D.C. Va. 1959). See Buck v. New York
Central R.R., 275 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1960).
33. The legislative history of the amendment rationalizes the choice of this test
as follows: "The proposal to rest the test of jurisdiction upon the 'principal place
of business' of a corporation has ample precedent in the decisions of our courts
and in Federal statutes such as the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.
§ 11 [1958]). There is thus provided sufficient criteria to guide courts in future
litigation under this bill." U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3099, 3102 (1958).
34. The "circumstances" to be considered are apparently the character of the
corporation, its purposes, the kind of business in which it is engaged, the situs
of its operations, a general survey of the corporation's activities, and a compari-
son of :its activities at each place in respect to their character, importance and
amount. Moesser v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 173 F. Supp. 953 (D.C. Pa.
1959). This determination may well require more time and effort than the sub-
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mean either nothing or whatever one wishes to read into it. In
short, this is a trap for the unwary, and one that in a doubtful
case requires the plaintiff to guess as to whether the federal
court has jurisdiction to hear and determine his case. We may
develop some sort of a workable standard to assist in making
this vital determination, but such a standard is in the future.
For the present we are left to our own devices, a situation which
has not proved to be notably successful in the past.3 5
When the determination is made that diversity of citizenship
exists on the face of the complaint, the attorney for the stock-
holder is faced with still another possibility which may bring
an abrupt end to his progress in the federal court. This hidden
menace is known as the doctrine of realignment of parties. As
stated in Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank,3 6 "Diversity juris-
diction cannot be conferred upon the federal courts by the par-
ties' own determination of who are plaintiffs and who defend-
ants. It is our duty, as it is that of the lower federal courts, to
'look beyond the pleadings and arrange the parties according to
their sides in the dispute.' "
Let us assume this situation: P, a stockholder in the X cor-
poration and a citizen of State A, brings a stockholder's deriva-
tive action against the X corporation, deemed to be a citizen of
states B and C, Y, a citizen of state B, and Z, a citizen of state D.
On the face of the complaint it appears that diversity juris-
diction exists. However, if the X corporation should be realigned
as a party plaintiff, then diversity would fail since a citizen of
state B would then be found on each side of the controversy
in violation of the complete diversity rule.37 This has, in the
past, been a most difficult situation, for the determination as
to whether the parties were to be realigned was a most delicate
question.3 8 In a stockholder's derivative action the right which
stantive matters involved in the particular case. See also Mattson Cuyuna Ore.
Co., 180 F. Supp. 743 (D.C. Minn. 1960) ; Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood
Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862 (D.C. N.Y. 1959); Riley v. Gulf M. & O.R.R., 173
F. Supp. 416 (D.C. Ill. 1959) ; Bryfogle v. Acme Market, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 43
(D.C. Pa. 1959) ; Note, 44 MINN. L. REv. 308 (1959).
35. As to whether the Bankruptcy Act provides sufficient criteria for deter-
mining this question, see Comment, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1287, 1295 (1958) ; and
Harker v. Kopp, 172 F. Supp. 180 (D.C. Ill. 1959).
36. 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941).
37. See note 26 supra.
38. In the difficult and complicated case it is not a simple matter to determine
where the "collision of interest" exists between multiple parties. "It must be
ascertained from the 'principal purpose of the suit,' . . . and the 'primary and
controlling matter in dispute'...." Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank, 314
U.S. 63, 69 (1941).
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the plaintiff is seeking to enforce is that of the corporation.
Normally the corporation would be the party plaintiff, but be-
cause of refusal on the part of management, the stockholder
is acting for the corporation. However, since the judgment will
bind the corporation and a judgment if recovered will run in
favor of the corporation, the corporation is denoted as an in-
dispensable party and must be joined in the action. 39 Does the
fact that the corporation has failed or refused to enforce its
cause of action indicate that it is antagonistic to one of its stock-
holders who brings the action for the corporation? This is the
very crux of the problem. If the corporation is antagonistic to
the plaintiff-stockholder, then it is properly joined as a party
defendant and diversity exists. If, on the other hand, the cor-
poration is not deemed to be antagonistic to the stockholder and
since the cause of action is that of the corporation, it should
properly be realigned as a party plaintiff with the result that
diversity will be destroyed. 40
In the most recent case in which this problem was considered
by the Supreme Court,41 the holding was that, absent collusion,
if the corporation refuses to act to enforce its rights, regardless
of reason, then it is antagonistic to the stockholder attempting
to enforce such right and is therefore properly designated as a
party defendant. 42 In the illustration we have used above, this
39. See note 27 supra.
40. "The cause of action which such a plaintiff brings before the court is not
his own but the corporation's. It is the real party in interest and he is allowed to
act in protection of its interest somewhat as a 'next friend' might do for an in-
dividual, because it is disabled from protecting itself. If, however, such a case as
this were treated as other actions, the federal court would realign the parties for
jurisdictional purposes according to their real interests. In this case, which is
typical of many, this would put (the corporation) on the plaintiff's side . . . and
jurisdiction would be ousted. . . . But jurisdiction is saved in this class of cases
by a special dispensation because the corporation is in antagonistic hands." Koster
v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522-523 (1947).
41. Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
42. The court dealt with the issue of antagonism as follows: "There will, of
course, be antagonism between the stockholder and the management where the
dominant officers and directors are guilty of fraud or misdeeds. But wrongdoing
in that sense is not the sole measure of antagonism. There is antagonism whenever
the management is aligned against the stockholder and defends a course of conduct
which he attacks. . . . It seems to us that the proper course is not to try out
the issues presented by the charges of wrongdoing but to determine the issue of
antagonism on the face of the pleadings and by the nature of the controversy. ...
The management may refuse or fail to act for any number of reasons. Fraud
may be one; the reluctance to take action against a close business associate may
be another; honest belief in the wisdom of the course of action which the manage-
ment has approved may be still another; and so on.
"As the court said in Delaware & Hudson Co. v. Albany & S.R. Co., 213 U.S.
435, 451, where the management was deemed to be antagonistic to the stockholder,
'The attitude of the directors need not be sinister. It may be sincere.' Whenever
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would mean that there would be no realignment of the corpora-
tion and diversity jurisdiction would be preserved. It should be
observed, however, that this was the decision of a court split
five to four on this issue. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the course
of the dissenting opinion describes the majority opinion in this
language: "The court thus makes the exception the rule, and
by confounding the requirements for establishing a substantive
cause of action with the requirements of diversity jurisdiction,
it overturns a half-century's precedents in this court. ' 43
At the moment, and it is a moment of doubtful length, it
would appear that a victory has been won by the stockholders.
The spectre of realignment in a stockholder's derivative action
has now faded into the background. If there is no evidence of
collusion between the corporation and the stockholder, whereby
the stockholder is bringing the suit because the corporation
could not do so in a federal court, diversity being lacking,44 it
seems that every such action will be within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, or rather, the corporate defendant will not
be realigned in such cases, thereby destroying the requisite di-
versity. Under the antagonistic standard used by the court,
whenever a stockholder's derivative action can be brought, i.e.,
whenever the corporation refuses to act, then antagonism auto-
the management refuses to take action to undo a business transaction or when-
ever, as in this case, it so solidly approves it that any demand to rescind would
be futile, antagonism is evident." Id. at 95-97.
43. Id. at 98.
44. "Since the decision of this court in Dodge v. Woolsey . . . the frequency
with which the most ordinary and usual chancery remedies are sought in the Fed-
eral courts by a single stockholder of a corporation who possesses the requisite
citizenship, in cases where the corporation whose rights are to be enforced cannot
sue in those courts, seems to justify a consideration of the grounds on which that
case was decided, and of the just limitations of the exercise of those principles.
"This practice has grown until the corporations created by the laws of the
States bring a large part of their controversies with their neighbors and fellow-
citizens into the courts of the United States for adjudication, instead of resorting
to the State courts, which are their natural, their lawful, and their appropriate
forum. . . . A corporation having such a controversy, which it is foreseen must
end in litigation, and preferring for any reason whatever that this litigation shall
take place in a Federal court, in which it can neither sue its real antagonist nor
be sued by it, has recourse to a holder of one of its shares, who is a citizen of
another State. This stockholder is called into consultation, and is told that his
corporation has rights which the directors refuse to enforce or to protect. He
instantly demands of them to do their duty in this regard, which of course they
fail or refuse to do, and thereupon he discovers that he has two causes of ac-
tion. . . . [T]he overburdened courts of the United States have this additional
important litigation imposed upon them by a simulated and conventional arrange-
ment, unauthorized by the facts of the case or by the sound principles of equity
jurisdiction." Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 452 (1881). Out of this case
arose the procedural limitations on the right of stockholders to bring derivative
actions which were formalized in former Equity Rule 27 and the present Rule
23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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matically exists. This result seems questionable regardless of
one's personal feelings as to the liberality which should be af-
forded stockholders in bringing derivative actions. The majority
decision apparently identifies the corporation with the manage-
ment to the extent that it places the corporation itself in the
position of being an active wrongdoer. In fact, this is not so.
The corporation itself is a neutral agent. Management in this
day and age certainly should be considered as having an exist-
ence separate and apart from that of the corporation - the
status long accorded to the stockholders. If a wrong has been
committed, it is not that of the corporate entity, but it is an
act or omission by individual officers and/or directors. It is
unrealistic to attach such significance to the inanimate corpora-
tion and to say that the corporation is antagonistic to a stock-
holder, when, in fact, the antagonism exists between the stock-
holder and the individuals who comprise the corporate manage-
ment. If we were to slice through the gloss placed upon the
corporate entity by the excessive and misguided use of fictions,
we would surely come to the conclusion that the corporation
should in all cases be made a party plaintiff in stockholder's
derivative actions. Through the application of simple logic, it
is difficult to reach any result other than that the entity that is
alleged to have been injured, that "owns" the cause of action,
and that will receive the benefit of a favorable judgment must
be a party plaintiff in such suits. If, in fact, the stockholder
is acting in a capacity somewhat similar to that of a "next
friend, ' 45 then this belief is strengthened, for is there any situa-
tion in which the "next friend" and the real party in interest are
found on opposite sides of the controversy ?46
The situation is one that leaves much to be desired. Ill-
advised classifications of parties do not aid the cause of the
stockholder. A decision not based upon reality or perception
of the real nature of the controversy in a stockholder's derivative
action merely serves as an invitation to attack upon the doctrine
enunciated and a compounding of the already difficult position
of the stockholder.
In addition to meeting the standards of diversity jurisdiction,
the stockholder must also satisfy the amount in controversy re-
45. See Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
46. The same test of antagonism was applied in the companion case of Swanson
v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114 (1957). The dissent in Smith v. Sperling also applies to
Swanson v. Iraer.
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quirement. The jurisdictional amount necessary to confer juris-
diction on the federal court in all diversity cases, including
derivative actions, is $10,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. 47
The test as to the presence of the required amount in controversy
is the amount of damage asserted to have been sustained by the
corporation as a result of the alleged wrongdoing.48 Rarely will
the amount in controversy be a factor limiting the use of the
stockholder's derivative action, for the simple reason that in
order to arouse a stockholder to take action, the wrong must
almost of necessity be very substantial, certainly in excess of the
jurisdictional amount. This, then, should prove to be no detri-
ment to the effectiveness of the stockholder's remedy in the
federal courts.
A limiting factor of much more importance is the necessity
of obtaining personal jurisdiction over all of the defendants. In
the usual situation, the stockholder will be attempting to obtain
some form of redress of a personal nature from the wrongdoing
parties, and this, of course, requires that the court first obtain
personal jurisdiction over all of the defendants, including the
stockholder's corporation. The factor that makes satisfaction
of this requirement difficult is the territorial limitation on
service of process issuing out of the federal courts. Under Rule
4 (f),49 service of summons must normally be made within the
state in which the particular district court is sitting. This means
that all defendants must be served within this particular state-
a task that is not too easily performed today. If anything, it
is probably more unusual than not to find all of the defendants
in a case such as a stockholder's derivative action subject to
service within the boundaries of a single state.
Congress has made available in the stockholder's derivative
action a relaxation of this normal rule, one that does much to
solve the service problem, by authorizing service of process on
the corporation in any district where it is organized or licensed
to do business or is doing business.50 It is unfortunate that the
statute is phrased in terms of "district" rather than "state,"'"
but it seems reasonably clear that the intent was to authorize
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1958).
48. Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
49. FFD. R. Civ. P., Rule 4(4).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1948).
51. The use of the term "district" is common in venue statutes, and, in fact,
the language of Section 1695 is almost identical with that used in Section 1391 (c)
dealing with residence of corporations for venue purposes.
[Vol. XXII
1962] SHAREHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE ACTION 597
service within any state wherein the corporation is incorporated,
is licensed to do business or is actually doing business. Perhaps
the reason for this relaxation is that the corporation, although
an indispensable party, is not one of the active contestants. This
provision has the effect of expanding personal service to some
extent, but does not affect the basic requirement that all of the
defendants be served within the state in which the court is
sitting.52
When coupled with the requirement that there is a basis for
the exercise of jurisdiction over each defendant in the particular
state, this limitation on the scope of service presents one of the
most severe restrictions upon the right of a stockholder to bring
a derivative action in a federal court. This is especially true
when the problem is considered in the context of the venue re-
quirements.
VENUE
Although venue means place of trial,5 in practice it means
the place where suit may be commenced, unless the defendants
consent to the action being brought in a place of improper
venue. 54 Venue is not a phase of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, as was at one time thought, but is a personal privilege
granted to defendants as a protection against oppression.55 As
used in the federal courts, however, it has become a device by
which the business of the courts may be controlled-strict venue
provisions limit the number of suits, liberal venue provisions
will result in an increase in the number of cases coming before
the courts. This was recognized at an early date, and Congress
has seen fit to retain a rather limited form of venue as a control
device.
In the normal diversity action there are two districts of
proper venue - the district of residence of all plaintiffs and the
52. If plaintiff lays the venue of the action in the district of his residence, he
need now be concerned only with the amenability of the defendants other than the
corporation to service of process within that state. The corporation may be served
quite easily. It is true, however, that the corporation will normally be subject to
service in a wider number of states than an individual defendant so that this dis-
pensation may not be the solution it appears to be at first glance.
53. Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166 F.Supp. 790 (D.C. Ill. 1958);
Caster v. American Bus Lines, Inc., 169 F.Supp. 460 (D.C. Neb. 1959).
54. Stackpole Motor Transp., Inc. v. Malden Spinning & Dyeing Co., 263 F.2d
47 (2d Cir. 1958).
55. Commercial Ins. Co. v. Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177 (1929) ; Neirbo Co. v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
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district of residence of all defendants. 5 In this area also, Con-
gress has enacted a liberalizing provision for stockholders' de-
rivative actions, providing as an additional place of venue the
district of residence of the corporation. 57 One would think that
this was a simple proposition until the question of residence of
a corporation for venue purposes is examined. Section 1391 (c) 5 8
indicates in very obtuse language that the residence of a corpora-
tion for venue purposes is any district in which it is incorpo-
rated, licensed to do business or is doing business.59 Such is the
result of attempting to create an artificial "residence" for an
inanimate being. In the stockholder's derivative action, this
means that the plaintiff-stockholder has the following choices as
to venue: the district of his residence, the district or districts in
which his corporation was incorporated, any district in which his
corporation is licensed to do business, any district in which his
corporation is doing business, and the district of residence of all
of the defendants. This is truly a plaintiff's dream, for this
could conceivably include every district in the United States in
the case of the large corporations with far-flung activities. Sure-
ly service of process can be obtained on all defendants in one of
these districts.
To assure that this summarily disposes of the venue problem,
however, underestimates the ingenuity and perseverence of de-
fense attorneys, and the willingness of the courts to indulge in
the judicial version of "Tinkers to Evers to Chance" -a double
play and the side is retired. To some of the federal courts con-
sidering this problem, the phrase "where the corporation might
have sued the same defendants," although appearing in a venue
provision, implies that the corporation must have been able to
bring the suit in the first instance from a diversity point of view.
Consider this example: P, a citizen of state X, brings a stock-
holder's derivative action in state Y against the A corporation,
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1948).
57. Id. § 1401 provides as follows: "Any civil action by a stockholder on
behalf of his corporation may be prosecuted in any judicial district where the
corporation might have sued the same defendants." If the corporation were to
sue the same defendants venue could be laid in the district of residence of all
defendants, which district is also available in the suit by a stockholder, or in any
district of residence of the corporation-plaintiff, which, but for the provisions of
Section 1401, would not be available in an action brought by the stockholder.
58. Id. § 1391(c).
59. Section 1391(c) provides that "A corporation may be sued in any judicial
district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business,
and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation
for venue purposes." The specific problem with this section is caused by the use
of the phrase "may be sued" rather than "sue or be sued."
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incorporated in state Y, and other defendants, one of whom is a
citizen of state Y, and one of whom is a resident of state X.
Venue can be justified here only on the basis that the corpora-
tion could properly have brought an action against the defend-
ants in state Y, this being one place of residence for the corpora-
tion. But, say these courts, in this situation the corporation
could not have sued these defendants anywhere in a federal court
since diversity of citizenship is lacking, citizens of state Y being
found on both sides of the controversy. Hence, the corporation
could not have sued in state Y, nor may the plaintiff-share-
holder.80 On the credit side of the ledger is the fact that this
tortured logic has not been accepted by all of the courts,61 but
the fact remains that at the moment there is a split of authority
which tends to destroy the value of the liberalizing provision to
the plaintiff. The existence of such procedural difficulties based
upon an interpretation of statutes leads to the conclusion that
there has been a notable lack of precision in drafting the perti-
nent statutes, resulting in the creation of problems which are
pointless and which are merely sources of needless and prolonged
confusion.
Under the present status of the law in this area, the only
safe course is to be guided by the interpretation given in the
particular district under consideration by the plaintiff. The best
that can be said is that an attempt by Congress to enlarge the
permissible places of good venue in stockholder's derivative
actions may be frustrated by the unrealistic statutory interpreta-
tion utilized by some of the federal courts. 2 The provision is a
reasonable and helpful one. It recognizes that the action is that
of the corporation, and but for the opposition of management,
the action would be brought by the corporation.
Before leaving the venue problem, it might be well to men-
tion the fact that there is no assurance that a case will be tried
in the district in which it is brought. Section 1404 (a) 68 allows
the transfer of a case to another district of proper venue in the
60. See Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp., 170 F.2d 707, cert. denied, 336
U.S. 937 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Sale v. Pittsburgh Steel Co., 57 F.Supp. 283 (D.C. Pa.
1944).
61. See Saltzman v. Birrell, 78 F.Supp. 778 (D.C. N.Y. 1948) ; Montro Corp.
v. Prindle, 105 F.Supp. 460 (D.C. N.Y. 1952) ; Beury v Beury, 127 F.Supp. 786
(D.C. W.Va. 1954).
62. "Like most procedural devices, its usefulness is susceptible to being nibbled
away by those who regard it as an unwelcome stranger in an unsuitable environ-
ment." Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1948).
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interests of convenience of the parties. Although space will not
permit a detailed treatment of this problem, it is one with which
the attorney for the plaintiff must be familiar. Even though
the suit is brought in a district of proper venue, the court may
permit a transfer to another district if the facts indicate this
second district to be a more convenient forum.0 4 This, of course,
has been and will in the future be another tactical weapon in the
arsenal of the defense attorney.
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23 (b)
In addition to complying with the jurisdiction, service, and
venue requirements for bringing suit in the federal courts, the
stockholder-plaintiff must also comply with the provisions of
Rule 23(b) 5 governing stockholder derivative actions. The ef-
fect of Rule 23 (b) is to create three conditions which must be
met by a stockholder desiring to bring a derivative action in a
federal court. The first requirement is that the stockholder must
have been such at the time of the transaction about which he
complains, or, if he was not, his stock must have been acquired
thereafter by operation of law. This is one of the most bitterly
contested provisions governing the right to bring a derivative
action in the federal courts, and one for which many states have
been roundly criticized. 6 As with most restrictions, a reasonable
argument can be made both pro and con. It does seem desirable
that the plaintiff seeking to enforce the corporation's right be
one who was a member of the corporation when the alleged
wrongdoing occurred for, at least in theory, it is this group that
has been fleeced by the management group. This argument
would be strengthened if it were possible to say that one pur-
chasing stock on the open market today has the means of rea-
sonably determining whether management of the corporation
has acted wrongfully in some prior transaction or operation.
The realities of the situation, however, indicate that this is just
not so. We have already indicated that the discovery of mal-
feasance on the part of management is one of the most difficult
tasks of the stockholder group. How then can we, on the basis
64. Although Section 1404(a) is not merely a restatement or codification of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the tests laid down in the forum non con-
veniens cases are generally applied. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501
(1947) ; Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
65. FED. R. Civ. P., Rule 23(b).
66. See Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1947) ; de Capriles, Fifteen Year Survey of Corporate Developments,
13 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959).
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of theory of implied knowledge, prohibit a stockholder from act-
ing when he first obtains the necessary knowledge - a process
that may take considerable time? The background of this rule
is not difficult to perceive. It is the fear of the "strike suit" that
influences both courts and legislatures to apply restrictions on
the use of the derivative weapon. Unfortunately, the evidence
of the extensive use of the derivative action as a "strike suit"
is not readily available, except perhaps from sources whose im-
partiality is subject to a certain degree of doubt.8 7
Granted that the stockholder's derivative action is subject to
abuse - and I know of no procedural device that is not - would
it not be better to require either ownership at the time of the
alleged wrong or knowledge first obtained after the purchase of
the stock? If the evil against which the rule is directed is the
purchase of stock solely for the purpose of bringing a derivative
action, would not the addition of the latter requirement prevent
this without interfering with the proper exercise of the rights
of a stockholder who is unfortunate enough to become a member
of a corporation after a wrongful act has occurred but in time
to suffer the consequences? It would seem that the only real
merit to the rule as it exists is that it attempts to protect those
stockholders who were the beneficiaries of the corporate trust
at the time of the breach. The effect as to new stockholders is
to extend the doctrine of caveat emptor to unfortunate lengths,
and to offer an unwise protection to directors and officers who
fall prey to the temptations of management power.6
The second requirement is one with which few would find
fault, and it is, in fact, merely an expression of the traditional
jurisdictional viewpoint of the federal courts. This requirement
is that the stockholder's action not be the product of collusion
between the stockholder and management to confer jurisdiction
upon the court which would not otherwise exist.6 9 This rule en-
67. Note the following statement: "Derivative actions have come to harbor as
a matter of course solicitation and inducement in bringing them, champerty and
maintenance in their prosecution, the brokerage of litigation in their trial, and
division of fees with laymen at their conclusion." CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE
STATE OF NEw YoaK, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE
SUITS 48 (1944).
68. It should be noted that this rule was first adopted in the federal courts in
1881 in the case of Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, and has been continued over
the years first in the form of former Equity Rule 27, and most recently in Rule
23(b). It may well be time to reconsider the usefulness of this contemporaneous
ownership rule as a necessary limitation on the amount of diversity litigation in
the federal courts.
69. The conferring of jurisdiction on the federal courts by collusion is also
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visions the situation where corporate management wishes to
commence an action in a federal court against a third party, but
is -prevented from doing so because of lack of diversity of citizen-
ship.70 It is doubtful if such a situation would arise in this day
and age, and if, in a particular case, it was deemed necessary by
management to have the action brought in federal court, where
the corporation could not do so, the curse of collusion could be
avoided and the end attained simply by "leaking" to the press
the fact that a cause of action existed against the third party,
but would not be enforced by the corporation for some reason
deemed good and sufficient by the management. In the situation
that causes real concern for the protection of stockholder's rights
- abuse of power by the management group - there is little
cause for concern that collusion will occur.
The third requirement of Rule 23(b) is that the plaintiff-
stockholder must allege in his complaint that he has made an
effort to secure the desired relief from the management group
and the reasons why such relief was not obtained, or, in the
alternative, must allege why no such effort was made by him.
This constitutes a simple "exhaustion of remedies" requirement,
and is certainly justified. The courts should not be called upon
to intervene in internal corporate affairs until the stockholder
has attempted to have his grievance adjusted internally. This is
all well and good, but it will have little, if any, effect on the com-
mencement of a proper stockholder's derivative action. The very
reason for this remedy is that management is acting adversely
to the interests of the stockholder and that he has no means of
redress other than the courts. If the management group is in-
volved in action detrimental to the interests of the corporation,
and thus detrimental to the interests of the stockholders, obvious-
ly there will be no relief granted internally. The adversity of
the situation effectively prevents internal solution of the dis-
pute. Or, to put it more strongly, if management would adjust
the grievance of a stockholder, then the particular situation is
one not properly falling within the scope of the derivative action
at all. As an inhibiting agent, this provision has been remark-
ably unsuccessful, and rightfully so. Applying the equitable
maxim that equity does not require the doing of a useless act,
the courts have almost universally held that the allegation of
prohibited by 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1948). See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U:S. 91
(1957).
70. See note 44 aupra.
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adverse control of the corporation in the person of the alleged
wrongdoers will satisfy this requirement.71 It should be empha-
sized, however, that this is a necessary allegation, and the fail-
ure to so allege in the complaint will be grounds for a dismissal
of the action. 72
Having met all of the requirements outlined above, the plain-
tiff in a stockholder's derivative action finds himself in full pos-
session of the discovery tools available under the Federal Rules,78
and through the judicious use of these tools he should be in a
position to carry his case to trial and ultimately to victory as in
any other case brought in the federal courts.
CONCLUSION
Under the very best of conditions the stockholder's derivative
action is a most difficult type of action. It suffers the infirmi-
ties of lack of information, substantial expense, difficulty of
proof, and the unfortunate situation of facing the full majesty
of the corporate power in support of the very individuals who
have wronged the corporation. It is not a perfect remedy by any
means, but it is the only effective remedy available to the stock-
holder who wishes to raise his voice against an abuse of power
by the management forces.
The federal courts are an available forum for such suits and
Congress has attempted to make the task of bringing derivative
actions into the federal courts an easier one than is the lot of
the average case. That this has not succeeded completely is due
to unfortunate lapses in statutory drafting which has opened the
door to strained and restrictive interpretations on the part of
some of the courts. Even without such interpretations it is not
a simple matter to bring the stockholder's derivative action into
the federal courts because of the exacting nature of the diversity,
service and venue requirements, but the task is not hopeless by
any means. In the case of the national corporation the federal
courts are more readily available; it is in the more modest-sized
corporation that the difficulties become acute. The most press-
ing need for the future is a provision making it possible to
utilize a federal court in a stockholder's derivative action where
71. There is some justification for the statement of the dissenting opinion in
Smith v. Sperling, supra, that the majority opinion confused this provision of
Rule 23(b) with the requirements for diversity jurisdiction.
72. Hausman v. Bailey, 22 F.R.D. 304 (D.C. N.Y. 1958).
73. FEw. R. Civ. P., Rules 26-37.
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the geographical peculiarities of a given case make it impossible
today for a stockholder to find a proper court either state or
federal which might exercise jurisdiction. With the addition of
such a provision, the federal courts would become a truly ef-
fective forum for the protection of stockholder rights.
